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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 10-4140 & 10-4241 
 ___________ 
 
 JEROME PREVET, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
MICHAEL C. BARONE, SUPERINTENDENT; MAJOR MR. PAUL A. ENNIS; 
UNIT MANAGER MR. GRAHAM; COUNSELOR MR. BLICHA; 
PAROLE BD SUPER. MRS. EVERTTE; *SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
PAROLE AGENT MRS. BAKER; PAROLE AGENT MRS. LUTZ; 
MRS. CYNTHIA L. DAUB, PAROLE BOARD SECRETARY; PAROLE AGENT MR. 
HOUGES 
 
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09-cv-00160) 
 Magistrate Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 20, 2011 
 
 Before:  BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: May 20, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Jerome Prevet, an inmate at SCI-Forest in Pennsylvania, appeals from an order of 
the District Court granting summary judgment to the defendants in this pro se civil rights 
action.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Prevet is serving a prison sentence of seventeen to thirty-four years for a 1981 
conviction.  His maximum sentence expires on October 21, 2014.  He has been 
considered for and denied parole on a number of occasions.  His last hearing occurred in 
March 2009.  At that time, he had recently completed the prison’s sex-offender treatment 
program, which the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) had 
previously listed as a requirement for parole consideration.  Citing the negative 
recommendation supplied by the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and Prevet’s 
minimization of the nature and circumstances of his offense, however, the PBPP again 
denied parole. 
 In July 2009, Prevet filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He named as 
defendants several DOC and PBPP employees and alleged, inter alia
 The District Court awarded summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the 
parole denial was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” and that the 
, that he was denied 
parole because (1) he had previously filed grievances and lawsuits against prison officials 
and (2) he is a member of the Nation of Islam.  He claimed that the DOC defendants had 
retaliated against him by refusing to provide the positive parole recommendation, and 
that the PBPP defendants had retaliated against him by denying parole. 
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PBPP would have rendered the same decision notwithstanding any motivation to 
retaliate.  See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2002).  Prevet filed a 
timely appeal, confined to a challenge to the District Court’s ruling on his retaliation 
claims.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When reviewing a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, we exercise plenary review, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.  
   
Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 
225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment should be granted only if there is no 
genuine as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge
Prison officials are liable for retaliatory conduct if the conduct was motivated “in 
substantial part by a desire to punish [the] individual for exercise of a constitutional 
right,” 
, 632 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Thaddeus-X v. 
Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)), such as an inmate’s filing of 
lawsuits and grievances related to incarceration, or his religious practice.  See Mitchell v. 
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Milhouse v. Carlson
                                                 
1 We note that the defendants did not raise, and the District Court did not consider, 
whether Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Prevet’s challenge to his parole 
denial.  See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although we 
directed the parties to address this issue, along with whether the defendants had waived 
the defense by failing to raise it, see Kramer v. Vill. of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 
862-63 (7th Cir. 2004), they did not do so.  Because we agree with the District Court’s 
decision to deny the claims on the merits, we need not decide whether Heck would bar 
Prevet’s challenge. 
, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 
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1981).  To prevail on a retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove:  (1) that the conduct 
leading to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered an 
adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
constitutional rights; and (3) that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating 
factor in the decision to discipline him.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 
2001).  However, “prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have 
made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest.”  Id.
 Here, the DOC defendants argue that even assuming that Prevet had established a 
prima facie case for retaliation, they acted pursuant to a legitimate penological interest in 
withholding a favorable parole recommendation, because of Prevet’s “poor adjustment, 
reflected in seven misconducts, multiple group failures and the nature of his offense . . . 
.”  Appellees’ Brief at 9.  We find these factors are indeed legitimate penological 
concerns, and that the DOC defendants met their burden of showing that they would have 
withheld a parole recommendation absent any retaliatory motive.  Similarly, the PBPP 
defendants denied parole based on the DOC’s negative recommendation, and Prevet’s 
“minimization of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed.”  We agree 
with the District Court that these are also legitimate penological concerns, and that the 
PBPP defendants met their burden of showing that they would have made the same 
decision absent any retaliatory motive.  The District Court thus properly granted 
summary motion in favor of the defendants. 
 at 334. 
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 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
